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been equally unsuccessful in showing that a nuisance existed in either
case. The conduct complained of fell within a "grey" area. It was not quite
a nuisance but it did cause considerable discomfort and annoyance to the
plaintiffs. Public authorities can often more effectively prevent uses of
this nature through comprehensive zoning ordinances than by bringing
nuisance actions. Tannery settling ponds, slaughterhouses and similar uses
can be prohibited in areas where they would cause discomfort to nearby
residents.
On the other hand, the Fritz case, in which the defendant operated a
garbage dump, demonstrates the effectiveness of the nuisance remedy as
opposed to zoning. The dump was located outside the corporate limits of
the city. Its existence could not be eliminated by zoning, but Illinois Re-
vised Statutes ch. 100%, § 27 (1957), authorizes municipal authorities to
abate such dumps within one mile of corporate boundaries. The nuisance
approach proved most successful under the circumstances.
In control of land use and other areas of regulation, the public nui-
sance approach may appear cumbersome and obsolete when compared to
comprehensive zoning and regulatory licensing. However, public authorities




Having discussed the nature of public and private nuisances, it is ap-
propriate now to examine the remedies available for both types of nuisance,
and the defenses thereto. The presentation of this subject matter will be
divided into remedies against a private nuisance, remedies against a public
nuisance, and defenses to both classifications. It must be kept in mind,
however, that it is difficult to give a case-by-case factual presentation in
the above manner because in most instances the determination of whether
an alleged nuisance is private or public is not made until the remedy has
already been selected and the case is at trial.
PRIvATE NUISANCES
Action at law for damages. As defined in an earlier section of this
symposium, to constitute a private nuisance to an individual landowner,
the interference with the use of his land caused by the neighbor's use of
his land must result in injury which differs in kind and not merely in
degree from that suffered by the public at large. If this is the case, then
the person suffering the injury can maintain an action at law for the dam-
ages suffered. Thus, the remedy available, to a large extent, is dependant
upon the nature of the damage suffered by the aggrieved party.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In Swain v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R.,' the plaintiff, a steamboat company,
sued to recover damages for the obstruction by the defendant of the Illinois
River by using, operating, and maintaining a railroad bridge across the
river so as to prevent navigation of the river by the plaintiff's steamboat.
The plaintiff was denied relief because of the fact that the nuisance was
public and not private, and this determination was based on the fact that
the plaintiff suffered damages of the same kind as the public at large,
though they were admittedly greater in degree. The court stated that since
the plaintiff had never before used the Illinois River in its business, its
damage was purely speculative-the loss of profits which might be derived
from the use of the river. Therefore, since it suffered only the obstruction
of a navigable waterway, it suffered the same damage as the public.
Even though the landowner suffers damage which is different in kind
than that suffered by the general public, the law will not give damages for
every inconvenience to or interruption of the rights of another. In Cooper
v. Randall,2 the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the lower court's instruc-
tions as to the nature of damages necessary to justify recovery. Therein, the
plaintiff had sued for damages caused by the operation by the defendant
of a flour mill on a lot near the plaintiff's premises which resulted in the
throwing of dirt, dust, and chaff upon and in the plaintiff's house. The
court stated that there are numerous annoyances which must inevitably
arise and accrue to the property of individuals, legal liability for which
cannot be fixed on any person. The law only gives damages for an injury
which is sensible, tangible, and material, and not simply for injury which
inconveniences the landowner or causes a trifling interruption.3
In a more recent case, which dealt with the granting of equitable re-
lief hereinafter to be discussed, it was evidently recognized that a land-
owner may recover nominal damages for the maintenance of a private
nuisance by a neighboring landowner.4 The plaintiffs had previously re-
covered, in an action at law, a verdict of one dollar in damages for each
year over a five year period, but the Supreme Court, characterizing the
injury as inconsequential, refused to grant equitable relief.5
Where the plaintiff bases his action on a negligence theory, he must
show a substantial injury to his land or its use and enjoyment. In Patterson
v. Peabody Coal Co.,6 the plaintiff sued to recover damages for the main-
' 160 Ill. App. 533 (2nd Dist. 1911), aff'd, 252 Ill. 622, 97 N.E.2d 247 (1912).
2 59 III. 317 (1871).
3 The plaintiff was denied recovery in the lower court, and on appeal, the Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed and remanded to the lower court due to the improper exclu-
sion of evidence.
4 Haack v. Lindsay Chemical Co., 393 111. 367, 66 N.E.2d 391 (1946).
5 Whether or not recovery in an action at law entitles one as a matter of course to
equitable relief will be discussed later under the section on injunctive relief for private
nuisances.
6 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1954).
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tenance of a coal mining operation by the defendant which created large
amounts of dust which was blowing over on the plaintiff's land and causing
him discomfort. The trial court rendered a verdict for the plaintiff and a
judgment in the amount of $5,000, but the Appellate Court reversed,
holding that, since the plaintiff had based his action on a negligence theory,
the consideration by the jury of damage which was not substantial and not
intentional was improper, and that the plaintiff had failed to prove a lack
of care on the defendant's part in the conduct of his business, the latter
being essential to recovery on a negligence theory.7
Injunctive relief. A landowner suffering damage as a result of the
maintenance of a private nuisance is not left to his remedy at law for
damages, but may maintain an action in equity to enjoin the maintenance
of the nuisance. The remedies are not exclusive, but are concurrent.8
It is not necessary in order to obtain injunctive relief that the exis-
tence of a nuisance first be tried at law. In Minke v. Hopeman,9 the plain-
tiff filed a bill in equity to enjoin the maintenance of a slaughterhouse
adjacent to his property which created a nauseous stench to the discomfort
of plaintiff's family. The court, in granting an injunction to the plaintiff,
stated that where there was a danger of irreparable loss or a material in-
jury being done before a trial at law could be had, equity may interfere
by injunction. However, the existence of the nuisance must be free from
substantial doubt before the equity court will intervene prior to an action
at law.10
Whether equity will automatically grant relief once the existence of
a nuisance has been established at law is a question which has caused some
difficulty. In City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co.," which dealt with
a public nuisance also inflicting damage peculiar to the plaintiff, the trial
court granted an injunction enjoining the defendant coal company from
conducting its operations so as to be detrimental to the public health. In
affirming the lower court's decree, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
while a court of equity has jurisdiction in these cases, it is, nevertheless, to
be exercised sparingly unless the rights of the parties and the existence of
7 Ibid. The court herein pointed out in accordance with § 822 of the Restatement
of Torts that to recover damages for the maintenance of a nuisance, the invasion must
be substantial, and the invasion must be either (a) intentional and unreasonable or (b)
actionable under rules governing liability for negligence.
8 In Barrington Hills Country Club v. Village of Barrington, 357 Ill. 11, 191 N.E.
239 (1934), riparian landowners sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from
discharging sewage into a creek above their premises. In answer to the defendant's claim
that the plaintiffs were limited to an action at law for damages, the court said: "The
law in Illinois is, and has long been settled. . . A private nuisance may be enjoined by
a suit in equity or the party suffering damage and injury may proceed at law, and the
remedies are concurrent and not exclusive." Id. at 20, 191 N.E. at 243.
9 87 I1. 450 (1877).
10 Off v. Exposition Coaster, 336 11. 100, 167 N.E. 782 (1929).
11 260 Ill. 111, 102 N.E. 992 (1913).
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the nuisance is determined in an action at law. The court thereby implied
that once the existence of the nuisance was resolved in an action at law,
equity would grant relief as a matter of course. However, in Haack v.
Lindsay Chemical Co., 12 the plaintiffs, having previously recovered dam-
ages in an action at law for the maintenance of a private nuisance, sought
to enjoin the defendant from continuing to operate its manufacturing plant
in such a way as to emit certain gases and fumes. It was their contention,
in reliance upon the statment in the City of Pana case, that the recovery
of damages in the previous action at law established their right to equitable
relief as a matter of course. The court rejected the statement in the City
of Pana case as dicta, and stated that such a statement ran counter to the
principles of equity since it is the duty of the equity courts to consider the
equities of the case, the surrounding circumstances, and the interests of
others involved. Thus, recovery at law does not conclusively establish an
aggrieved party's right to equitable relief.
The fact that a statute provides a remedy by indictment does not bar
one from obtaining equitable relief. In Minke v. Hopeman,1" the issuance
of an injunction enjoining the operation of a slaughterhouse 'adjacent to
the plaintiff's property was upheld even though the operation was declared
a nuisance by statute,14 and the defendant had previously been indicted
and acquitted. The court stated that the maintenance of the slaughter-
house, declared a public nuisance by statute, was also a private nuisance
with respect to the plaintiff.
However, a well-established principle of equity is that the equity court
will not enjoin the commission of a criminal offense if it has no jurisdic-
tion over the matter for some other reason, and on this basis, the equity
court has refused to enjoin a violation of a building ordinance15 or a public
health ordinance's on the mere allegation that the violation would result
in a private nuisance to. the complainant.
Self-help. Abatement of a nuisance without resort to the courts is
largely an outmoded and impractical method of relief, and exposes an
individual who attempts to utilize this remedy to the possibility of tort
liability for his acts. While older cases suggest that where the circum-
stances are such as to require an immediate remedy and to preclude await-
ing the slow progress of the ordinary forms of justice, a private individual
may resort to abatement on his own so long as he does so without un-
necessary damage.17 The very fact that there are so few cases on the pro-
priety of this remedy is indicative of its infrequent utilization.
12 393 Il. 367, 66 N.E.2d 391 (1946).
13 87 Il. 450 (1877).
14 See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 100, § 26 (formerly ch. 38, § 466) (1965).
15 Sheldon v. Weeks, 51 I1. App. 314 (1st Dist. 1893); Joseph v. Wieland Dairy Co.,
297 I1. 574, 13 N.E. 94 (1921).
10 Irving-Austin Bldg. Corp. v. Village Homebuilder, 312 Ill. App. 179, 37 N.E.2d 927
(1941).
17 Buck v. McIntosh, 140 Il. App. 9 (4th Dist. 1908).
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In one Illinois case involving the seizure of liquor during the pro-
hibition period, the liquor was declared by statute to be a nuisance per se.
A summary abatement, of this nuisance was permitted, though this remedy
was said to be limited to those circumstances where the condition of the
item is such that it is imminently dangerous to the safety or offensive to
the morals of the community, and is incapable of being put to any lawful
use by the owner.'8
PUBLIC NUISANCES
Criminal indictment. Various activities are defined under Illinois stat-
ute as public nuisances, and the statute so defining the activity as a nui-
sance generally provides for criminal punishment of the individual main-
taining the nuisance. This remedy is embodied principally in Chapter
100Y of the Illinois Revised Statutes. Section 26 enumerates a list of those
activities considered public nuisance by statute (such list does not exclude
common-law nuisances not enumerated), and Section 29 provides:
Whoever causes, erects or continues any such nuisance shall,
for the first offense, be fined not exceeding $100, and for a subse-
quent offense shall be fined in a like amount, and confined to the
county jail not exceeding 3 months. Every such nuisance, when
a conviction therefor is had may, by order of the court before
which the conviction is had, be abated by the sheriff or other
proper officer, at the expense of the defendant, and it shall be no
defense to any proceeding that the nuisance is erected or con-
tinued by virtue or permission of any law of this State.
Chapter 38, Section 13-3 of the Illinois Revised Statutes also provides
that the maintenance of a public place of accommodation or amusement
in which a violation of civil rights occurs is a public nuisance, and also
imposes a criminal penalty on one who denies to another the full and
equal enjoyment of the facilities and services of any public place of ac-
commodation or amusement because of race, religion, color, or national
ancestry. Section 13-3(a) states:
A person convicted of a violation of civil rights may be fined
not to exceed $1000, or may be imprisoned not more than 6
months, or both.
Injunctive relief. Where a nuisance is maintained so that it is injurious
to the public health or safety, a public nuisance exists, and equitable re-
lief may be granted only upon application of the Attorney General who
acts to abate the nuisance for the public benefit. 19 However, it is not
enough that the act complained of constitutes an indictable offense under
I8 People v. Marquis, 291 111. 121, 125 N.E. 757 (1920).
19t Swain v. C.B. & Q.R.R., 160 II. App. 533 (1911), aff'd, 252 Ill. 622, 97 N.E.2d
247 (1912).
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the criminal law, for as stated earlier, equity will not act to enjoin the
commission of a criminal offense unless it has jurisdiction over the matter
on some other grounds-namely that the act complained of constitutes a
nuisance.'
Thus, in Stead v. Fortner,20 the defendant therein was maintaining
certain premises on which the sale of liquor was being conducted in viola-
tion of the local law. In a suit by the Attorney General and the States At-
torney, the defendant was enjoined from carrying on such activity, even
though it constituted an indictable offense and previous attempts to punish
the defendant by criminal process had failed. The court stated that the
act of selling did not constitute the nuisance, but rather it was the mainte-
nance of a place which the General Assembly had determined to be danger-
ous to the health, morals, safety, and welfare of the public. The court
further stated that there need be no pecuniary damage to a property right
in a public nuisance, but only an invasion of the rights of the public in
general.
However, where the Attorney General is merely acting in the discharge
of his duty in the enforcement of the laws, and the ordinary methods of
criminal prosecution would be effective for this purpose, equity will de-
cline jurisdiction. 21 This reasoning sustained a reversal of a decree granting
a temporary injunction, on application of the Attorney General, enjoining
some 1400 defendants from open and notorious violations of the gambling
laws. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the complaint was defective
in that it sought only to enforce the criminal law by alleging conclusions
and not by alleging facts showing a nuisance.22
The Illinois Revised Statutes also provides that the States Attorney or
any citizen of the county in which the nuisance exists may maintain a com-
plaint in the name of the People of the State to enjoin the maintenance of
a nuisance, be it the maintenance of a house of prostitution,23 the mainte-
nance of any place for the unlawful sale or storage of narcotics drugs, 24 or
any of the other enumerated statutory public nuisances. 25 Injunctive relief
is also provided for in much the same manner as above for the enjoining
and abatement of a place of public accommodation or amusement wherein
a violation of civil rights occurs, the latter being declared a public nui-
sance.
26
20 255 Il1. 468, 99 N.E. 680 (1912).
21 ibid.
22 People ex rel. Barrett v. Fritz, 316 III. App. 217, 45 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1942).
23 II. Rev. Stat. ch. 1002, § 1 (1965).
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001/2, § 15 (1965).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001/2, § 26 (1965). See sections 2, 16, and 27 for the provisions
relating to maintaining a complaint in equity to enjoin and abate each of the respective
nuisances named.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 13-3(c) (1965).
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DEFENSES
The great majority of defenses raised to actions based on the mainte-
nance of nuisances, both public and private, arise where equitable relief
is sought and the defendant raises equitable defenses, the most common
of which is balancing of the hardships. Thus, where the defendant has
expended great sums of money on the construction of a manufacturing
plant, he claims that great injury would result to him were he prohibited
from operating his facility in proportion to the damage suffered by the
individual plaintiff.
The attitude of the courts when faced with this claim was exhibited
in Wente v. Commonwealth Fuel Co. 27 The court stated that if the exis-
tence of a private right and the violation of it are clear, it is no defense to
show that a party has been put to great expense in preparing to violate
that right. It was stated that the law does not undertake to estimate the
difference between the loss that would be sustained by the party owning
the thing complained of and the damage to the injured party, nor to grant
or withhold relief on such a basis. The same attitude was expressed in
Barrington Hills Country Club v. Village of Barrington28 wherein the court
said:
Conveniences have never been balanced in this State and equi-
ties have never been weighed where a private right or private
property was sought to be taken by other than due process of law
and the party injured sought to enjoin such taking.2 9
However, in Haack v. Lindsay Chemical Co.,8 0 a case discussed in an
earlier part of this article, the court denied the plaintiff equitable relief
even though the existence of the nuisance had been determined in a prior
action at law, declaring that it was the duty of the equity courts to con-
sider the equities of the case, and that the fact that the defendant was
engaged in essential war work was a factor in denying the plaintiff equi-
table relief. This seems to indicate a departure from the strict view earlier
taken by the courts on the balancing of the hardships claim.
In an action at law, the court will definitely not engage in any balanc-
ing of the hardships or conveniences. This was emphasized in a criminal
prosecution for the maintenance of a rendering works, the operation of
which was declared a public nuisance by statute. The defendant had
claimed that his acts were justified by the immediate urgency for the dispo-
sition of dead animals out of regard for the public health and convenience.
The court affirmed the lower court's conviction stating that it made no
difference that the work was in the interests of society or necessary for the
27 232 I11, 526 (1908).
28 357 I1. 11, 191 N.E. 239 (1934).
29 Id. at 20, 191 N.E. at 243.
30 393 111. 367, 66 N.E.2d 391 (1946).
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preservation of public health-so long as violation of a public right was
clear.S1
Another defense commonly raised, though to no avail, is that the
plaintiff acquired his property after the defendant was already operating
the alleged nuisance and that this gave the plaintiff notice of any inter-
ference to which he might later be subjected and, therefore, bars him from
relief. Both the equity and law courts have rejected this claim as im-
material and constituting no defense.8 2
Clearly, the defendant's ignorance of the fact that his operation was
being conducted in an offensive manner with respect to the complaining
property owners is no defense to an action to enjoin a private nuisance.
This defense was raised in an action by property owners to enjoin the
operation of a neighboring hospital by the defendants. The court rejected
it saying that the defendants were responsible for the management of the
institution, and that it was their duty to see that it was so conducted as to
not infringe on the rights of others.33 However, a person who comes into
possession of land as a grantee upon which a nuisance is being maintained
is not liable for merely permitting it to remain until he has been notified
or requested to remove it by the party injured by the nuisance.3 4
Lastly, the fact that the land was conveyed to the defendant by the
plaintiff does not later estop the grantor from complaining if the grantee
uses the land in a manner which constitutes a nuisance. 35
ROBERT J. JOHNSON
31 Seacord v. People, 121 IDI. 623, 1 N.E. 194 (1887).
32 Huff v. Coats, 221 Ill. App. 543 (4th Dist. 1921); Oehler v. Levy, 234 Il1. 595, 85
N.E. 271 (1908). Both cases quoted the following statement from Weir's Appeal, 74 Pa.
St. 230: "Carrying on an offensive trade for any number of years in a place remote from
buildings and public roads does not entitle the owner to continue it in the same place
after houses have been built and roads laid out in the neighborhood, to the occupant of
which and travelers upon which it is a nuisance. As the city extends, such nuisances
should be removed to the vacant grounds beyond the immediate neighborhood of the
residence of the citizens. This public policy, as well as the health and comfort of the
population of the city, demands."
33 Deaconess Hospital v. Bontjes, 207 II1. 553, 69 N.E. 748 (1904).
34 Loudon v. Mullins, 52 Ill. App. 410 (4th Dist. 1891).
35 Off v. Exposition Coaster, 336 Il. 100, 167 N.E. 782 (1929).
